




SEV-Step



A Single-Stepping Framework for AMD-SEV

Luca Wilke, Jan Wichelmann, Anja Rabich and Thomas Eisenbarth



Single Step Stepping



Single-Stepping Attacks

Idea, Exploits, Root Cause

Single-Stepping: Idea



normal




frequently interrupted





single-stepped

Single-Stepping: Attack Avenues



1. Interrupt latency [CCS'18, USENIX'21]



2. Interrupt counting [CCS'19, CHES'20-21, USENIX'20]




4. Amplification

[ATC'17, CCS'19/21, CHES'17-19,
S&P'20-21, USENIX'17/18/22]



3. Zero-step replaying

[USENIX'18, CCS'19, ISCA'19,
S&P'21]




SGX-Step



Can SEV VMs be single-stepped?


Single-Stepping: Mechanism



When do we exit?


- Intercepted Instruction
- Page Fault
- External Interrupt

Single-Stepping: Mechanism






Single-Stepping: Root Cause




Single-Stepping: Naive Implementation


Zero Step Single Step Multi Step




Single-Stepping: APIC Timing on SGX



Measurements from AEX-Notify paper




Single-Stepping: Enlarge the Window





Single-Stepping: Enlarge the Window





SEV-Step

Design Goals, Implementation, Ongoing work



SEV-Step: Design Goals


Reusability

- Separate primitives from attack logic

Interactivity


- Bidirectional Communication

SEV-Step: Reusability



SEV-Step: Reusability

↔ Data Flow
↔ Control Flow



SEV-Step: Design Goals

Reusability


- Separate primitives from attack logic

Interactivity

- Bidirectional Communication


SEV-Step: Interactivity?

↔ Data Flow
↔ Control Flow




SEV-Step: Interactivity

↔ Data Flow
↔ Control Flow



SEV-Step: Interactivity

↔ Data Flow
↔ Control Flow



SEV-Step: Design Goals

Reusability

- Separate primitives from attack logic

Interactivity

- Bidirectional Communication



SEV-Step: Ongoing Work

- Improve API
 - Current Design: Track/Untrack, Start Stepping/Stop Stepping
 - Goal: High Level Components: „Track Pagefault Sequence“
 - Model SEV-Step + SGX-Step as „drivers“

Summary

- Single-Stepping enables many attacks
- Popularized for SGX with SGX-Step
- SEV-Step Framework
 - First to show that SEV is vulnerable to single-stepping
 - Ease attack research on SEV
 - GPL V2
- Ongoing work
 - Improve attack prototyping
- Play with it, break it, Improve it

